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JUDGING THE NEXT EMERGENCY:
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS
David Cole*

INTRODUCTION
As virtually every law student who studies Marbury v. Madison1
learns, Chief Justice John Marshall's tactical genius was to establish

j udicial review in a case where the result could not be challenged. As a
technical matter, Marbury lost, and the executive branch won. As

furious as President Jefferson reportedly was with the decision, there

was nothing he could do about it, for there was no mandate to defy.

The Court's decision offered no remedy for Marbury himself, whose
rights were directly at issue, and whose rights the Court found had

indeed been violated. But over time, it became clear that the decision

was a landmark victory for those who consider judicial review of
political-branch action a critical element of a constitutional system.

Judicial review on matters of national security frequently follows

the Marbury model. It rarely provides relief to the individuals before

the Court when the national-security crisis is at its height. As in

Marbury itself, the challengers generally lose, and the government
generally wins. As a result, the conventional wisdom is that courts
function poorly as guardians of liberty in times of crisis. Schenck,2

Korematsu,3 and Dennis,4 from World War I, World War II, and the
Cold War, respectively, are a few of the more notorious examples. In

those cases, the Court authorized the criminalization of speech during

World War I, detention based on race during World War II, and guilt
by association during the Cold War.

* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1984, Yale University.
- Ed. In my capacity as a volunteer staff attorney for the Center for Constitutional Rights, I
was co-counsel in some of the cases discussed herein, including North Jersey Media Group,
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D.
Mich. 2002), and Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, No. 02-55082, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3 , 2003). My colleague Mark Tushnet provided invaluable
feedback, despite his evident disagreement with my position.

1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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The traditional view, based on these and other examples, holds

that j udicial review has largely failed to protect individual rights when
their protection is most needed. There are good reasons to suspect
that this would be so, and, as the examples cited above illustrate, there
is plenty of evidence to support the conventional wisdom. But the
conventional wisdom is too pessimistic. It is akin to arguing that
Marbury demonstrates the weakness of the judiciary because the

Court failed to afford Marbury himself relief for the violation of his
rights.

Considered over time, j udicial review of emergency and national

security measures can and has established important constraints on the

exercise of emergency powers and has restricted the scope of what is

acceptable in future emergencies.

Because

emergency

measures

frequently last well beyond the de facto end of the emergency, and

because the wheels of j ustice move slowly, courts often have an oppor
tunity to assess the validity of emergency measures after the emer

gency has passed, when passions have been reduced and reasoned

j udgment is more attainable. In doing so, courts have at least some

times been able to take advantage of hindsight to pronounce certain

emergency measures invalid for infringing constitutional rights. And
because courts, unlike the political branches or the political culture

more generally, must explain their reasons in a formal manner that
then has precedential authority in future disputes, j udicial decisions
offer an opportunity to set the terms of the next crisis, even if they
often come too late to be of much assistance in the immediate term.

Thus, the Court has over time developed a highly protective test for

speech advocating illegal activity,5 subjected all racial discrimination

since Korematsu to exacting scrutiny,6 and prohibited guilt by associa
tion.7 These decisions, among others, impose important limits on what

the government can do in the current, post-September 1 1 th crisis.

Since Marbury, scholars have devoted thousands of pages to

debating the issue of j udicial review, offering critiques of Chief Justice
Marshall's reasoning, proposing alternative defenses of j udicial review,

and, more recently, questioning the value of j udicial review altogether.
One of the most familiar, and in my view still the strongest, defenses

of j udicial review is that first advanced in footnote four of Carotene
Products,8 implemented by the Warren Court and given its definitive

academic elaboration in Professor John Hart Ely's Democracy and

Distrust. 9 This is the notion that as an institution insulated from

5. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
7. See, e.g., NAACP v . Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982).
8. Carolene Prods. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1944).
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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everyday politics, the Court is best suited to protect the interests of
those who cannot protect themselves through the political process,

whether they be members of discrete and insular minorities, dissi

dents, noncitizens, or other vulnerable individuals. As others have

shown, the Court does not always live up to its responsibility.10 But it is
nonetheless an important ideal to which courts should be held
accountable.
How should we judge judicial review from the standpoint of pro

tecting the constitutional rights and liberties of the vulnerable in times

of crisis? It is in times of crisis that constitutional rights and liberties
are most needed, because the temptation to sacrifice them in tl�e name

of national security will be at its most acute. To government officials,
civil rights and liberties often appear to be mere obstacles to effective

protection of the national interest. As Bush-administration supporters
frequently intone when defending their post-September 1 1th initia
tives, "the Constitution is not a suicide pact . " 1 1 Judicial protection is

also critical because crisis measures are typically targeted at the most
vulnerable among us, especially noncitizens, who have little or no

voice in the political process.12 We have been in such a crisis period

since September 1 1th and will be for the foreseeable future. So now is

a particularly propitious time to assess the value of j udicial review in
times of crisis.13

Part I of this Article will set forth the traditional view that the j udi

ciary is inadequate in times of crisis, along with the evidence that

supports it and the reasons that might explain it. Part II maintains that
the traditional view overstates the case, because over time judicial de

cisions have had more of a constraining influence on emergency
measures

than

performance

in

appears

when

the midst

one

looks

of a crisis.

Part

only
III

at

the

courts'

surveys judicial

performance since September 1 1th on matters of national security and

argues that while the record is far from exemplary, courts have actu
ally been more willing to stand up to the government in this period
than in many prior crises. Part IV responds to a recent proposal by

1 0. See, e.g. , GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
11. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Narrow, Prudent, and Impeccable, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 1 0,
2002. The quote comes from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
12. I develop this point in DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003) (hereinafter COLE,
ENEMY ALIENS].
13. I will resist offering broad generalizations about judicial review. Generalizing about
judicial review from the standpoint of how courts act in national emergencies is, to me, as
invalid as j udging the propriety of judicial review on the basis of the Supreme Court's
performance in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The fact that courts, like all other institu
tions, are susceptible to political pressure in times of high crisis does not warrant a rejection
of judicial review in general or of the ideals that animate it. I address only the somewhat
more specific question of how judicial review works in emergencies and on matters of na
tional security.
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two leading scholars that courts and the Constitution ought to play less
of a role in assessing emergency measures.14 Professors Oren Gross
and Mark Tushnet have both recently argued that the poor perform
ance of courts during emergency periods and the need for extraordi

nary emergency powers should impel us to acknowledge explicitly the

validity of extraconstitutional emergency measures and leave j udg

ment of such measures to the political rather than the j udicial process.

In my view, this proposal is fundamentally misguided, both because it
fails to acknowledge the valuable role that courts have played, when
viewed over time, in constraining emergency powers, and because the

alternative of relying on the political process would almost certainly

provide even less protection for individual rights than the courts have.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill, j udicial review is the worst protec
tor of liberty in times of crisis, with the exception of all the others.
I.

THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

The conventional wisdom is that courts are ineffective as guardians

of liberty when the general public is clamoring for security. Clinton
Rossiter, in an influential study of the Supreme Court in wartime,

concluded that:

the courts of the United States, from the highest to the lowest, can do
nothing to restrain and next to nothing to mitigate an arbitrary presiden

tial military program suspending the liberties of some part of the civilian
population.... Whatever relief is afforded, and however ringing the de

fense of liberty that goes with it, will be precious little and far too late.15

Judge Learned Hand similarly concluded that one cannot rely on

the courts in times when the people do not fight for their own rights:

I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon consti

tutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes.. . . Liberty
lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution,
no law, nor court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even

do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no

court to save it.16

Justice Robert Jackson took this view so far as to advocate in

dissent in Korematsu that the civil courts should simply refuse to en

force military orders. Jackson famously wrote:

14. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflec
tions on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273.
15. CLINTON ROSSITER & R. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 52 (expanded ed. 1976).
16. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED
HAND 89-90 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1960).
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Of course the existence of a military power resting on force, so vagrant,

so centralized, so necessarily heedless of the individual, is an inherent

threat to liberty. But I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a

review that seems to me wholly delusive.... If the people ever let com

mand of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands,

the courts wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon

those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in
the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.7
1

Finally, George Bernard Shaw gave the critique his own inimitable
flair in offering the following evaluation of the courts during World
War!:

[D]uring the war the courts in France, bleeding under German guns,

were very severe; the courts in England, hearing but the echoes of those
guns, were grossly unjust; but the courts in the United States, knowing
naught save censored news of those guns, were stark, staring, raving

mad.8
1

There is a wealth of evidence to support this conventional wisdom.

During the Civil War, apart from Chief Justice. Taney's ineffectual
solo intervention in Ex parte Merryman19 - in which he declared
invalid President Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus, only to have

Lincoln ignore him - the Supreme Court as a whole largely stayed
out of the war. During World War I, the Court failed to overturn a

single one of the more than one thousand convictions handed down

for speaking out against the war or the draft.20 It chose to review only
a handful of the convictions, and affirmed them all, most by a unani

mous vote.21 In World War II, the Court upheld the Japanese
internment and unanimously affirmed the military-tribunal convic

tions of several German saboteurs,22 with Justice Frankfurter playing a
lead role in crafting the majority decision despite having personally

played a critical advisory role in creating the tribunals in the first

place.23 In the early years of the Cold War, as well, the Court either

17. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) .
18. See Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145, 147 (D. Mont. 1920). Justice Brennan has advanced
much the same evaluation. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a
Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1 1 , 1 1
(1988) ("There is . . . a good deal t o be embarrassed about, when one reflects on the shabby
treatment civil liberties have received in the United States during times of perceived threats
to its national security." ) .
19. 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861) (No. 9487).
20. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12, at 12-13.
21. Id.
22. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
23. Melvin I. Urofsky, Inter A rma Silent Leges: Extrajudicial Activity, Patriotism and the
Rule of Law, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT IN WORLD
WAR II 27 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002).
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denied review or affirmed anti-Communist measures, thereby allowing
guilt by association to operate largely unchecked.24

There are at least four reasons why courts are likely to fare poorly

on matters of national security, especially in times of crisis. First, their

independence notwithstanding, j udges are part of the government and

are likely to identify with the government's interests when matters of
national security are at stake. The populace as a whole generally

rallies around the executive branch in times of crisis, and courts are
likely to do so as well. As history has shown, judges cannot stand

above the crisis, precisely because the threat at least presumably
implicates them as well - both as part of the government and as part
of the society.

Second, assessing claims of national security, especially during

times of crisis, is inherently difficult, and j udges are likely to feel
ill-equipped to do so. Most questions of constitutional rights and liber
ties present a question of balancing. Even the prohibition on race dis

crimination can be overcome by a sufficiently compelling j ustification
and narrowly tailored means.25 But how does one accurately measure

the risk that Al Qaeda might gain critical information enabling it to
attack us, or that an individual, if set free, might endanger the national
security?

Such decisions must inevitably rest on incomplete information, and

the courts' information is often even more incomplete than that of the

executive. The executive branch frequently has a monopoly on the
information because so much of it is classified, the challengers are

often unable to respond, and, absent adversarial testing, it is difficult

for a court to know whether the government has been fully candid in
its assessment. The Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu, in which
it deferred to military claims of necessity as j ustification for the
Japanese internment, was later shown to be based on an inaccurate
record; the executive branch concealed from the Court critical infor
mation about its own doubts concerning the reality of the threat posed

by the Japanese population. Indeed, the executive branch's misrepre
sentations were so fundamental that years later courts overturned the

convictions on writs of coram nobis.26

Third, courts must worry that if they rule against the government

on a matter of national security, they may face a potential test of their

credibility and legitimacy. If the Pre$ident truly believes that the secu-

24. ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED MONDAY
90-105 (1999); William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism:
The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375, 428-34.
25. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
26. Hirabayashi v . United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604-08 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v.
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (N.D. Cal. 1984). See generally PETER IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
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rity of the nation is at stake, it is entirely possible that he will defy any

decision against him.27 During the Civil War, for example, when Chief

Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman28 ruled that President Lincoln's
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was unconstitutional and

granted a writ of habeas corpus, the military refused to produce the

petitioner. Justice Taney then issued an attachment for contempt, but

the military refused to accept service of that order. President Lincoln
simply ignored Justice Taney's decision altogether.

Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, j udges must worry that if

they rule against the government, their decisions might be followed, at

some subsequent cost to national security. Just as no j udge wants to be
the one who has freed a defendant to commit violent crime again, so
no j udge wants to issue an order that actually causes serious harm to

the national security. And since prognostications about security risks
are j ust that, and one can never really be certain, j udges may be

inclined to err on the side of caution and the government. At the oral
argument before the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media Group v.

Ashcroft,29 a case challenging the constitutionality of the Attorney

General's decision to close to the public all immigration proceedings

involving hundreds of detainees labeled of "special interest" to the

September 1 1th investigation, Judge Morton Greenberg told the

ACLU lawyer arguing the case, "We could make a decision here . . .

and people could die. Lots of people . . . I saw the second hit [during

the World Trade Center attack of September 1 1th] , and I can't erase it

from my mind."30

II.

A REVISIONIST VIEW

While there are undoubtedly good reasons and plenty of evidence
to support the conventional wisdom that courts perform poorly on

matters of national security, that judgment ultimately rests on too
narrow a focus - namely, an assessment of how the courts have
performed in the midst of particular crises for the particular litigants

before them. When one asks instead what role j udicial decisions have
played over time in framing the options available to the executive

branch

in

emergency

periods,

a

less

pessimistic

evaluation

is

warranted. The Supreme Court's decisions during the waning of
emergencies, or after the emergencies have ended, have not infre
quently called into question or reversed its earlier rulings and have

27. See LOUIS SMITH, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER 266 (1951).
28. 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861).
29. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
30. A rguments Made on Deportation Hearing Regs, PA. L. WKLY, Sept. 23, 2002, at 9
(quoting Judge Greenberg).
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created precedents that impose a degree of restraint on the govern
ment's actions during the next emergency.
After the Civil War ended and President Lincoln was buried, for

example, the Supreme Court issued Ex parte Milligan,31 in which it de

clared that, as long as the civil courts remained open for business, the

President did not have constitutional authority to try a United States

citizen by military tribunal for allegedly conspiring with the enemy.

The Court broadly insisted that the Constitution applies equally in,

peacetime and wartime:

The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,

equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine,

involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of

man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the

great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy

or depotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for

the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it,

which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved
by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority.32

At the close of World War II, the Court decided Duncan v.
Kohanamoku,33 which, like Ex parte Milligan, imposed limits on

martial law by invalidating a conviction of a civilian in a military tri

bunal in Hawaii. The Court reasoned, as in Milligan, that trial by mili

tary tribunal was barred as long as the civil courts were open. Notably,

however, the Court delayed issuing a decision in Kohanamoku until

more than a year after it agreed to hear the case, leading one contem

poraneous commentator to speculate that the Court had purposefully
waited until it was clear that martial law would not have to be
reimposed in Hawaii.34

Similarly, while the Court consistently upheld the harsh suppres

sion of antiwar speech during World War I,35 it subsequently devel
oped increasingly stronger versions of the "clear and present danger"
test for protecting subversive speech. In Yates v. United States,36 de

cided two and one-half years after Senator Joseph McCarthy had been

31. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
32. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120-21 ; see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934) ("(The Constitution's] grants of power to the Federal
Government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of
emergency and they are not altered by emergency . . . even the war power does not remove
constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties").
33. 327 U.S. 304 (1 946).
34. EDWIN CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 04-05 (1947).
35. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1920); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 61 6, 629 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209-1 0 (1919); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1 919).
36. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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censured, the Court required the government to prove advocacy of ac
tion, not merely advocacy of abstract doctrine. That ruling put an end

to the ongoing use of the 1940 Smith Act37 to criminalize Communist

Party leaders for their advocacy.38 Still later, in 1969, the Court
adopted an even more speech-protective test in Brandenburg v. Ohio,

holding that speech advocating illegal conduct is constitutionally pro

tected unless it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless

action and is likely to incite or produce such action."39 That test
forecloses virtually any prosecution for speech advocating crime short
of an actual conspiracy to commit crime. With these rulings, the
Court's First Amendment doctrine now imposes significant limits on

the government's ability to restrict speech in times of emergency or as

a matter of national security. Thus, even though the Court did little to

help antiwar activists Schenck, Debs, Frohwerk, and Abrams during

World War I,40 or to stand up to McCarthyism at its height, the Court
ultimately adopted an interpretation of the First Amendment that pro
tects the rights of latter-day Schencks and Communists to speak as

they wish, so much so that outright censorship of antiwar speech is no

longer a plausible option for the government in wartime.
Supreme

Court

decisions

have

also

largely

barred

another

common tactic of emergency government - guilt by association. In
emergencies, authorities seeking to prevent future harm often resort
to guilt by association because it permits the imposition of guilt with
out proof that an individual has committed a specific violent act.41

When the Court in Yates effectively foreclosed prosecutions of

Communists under the Smith Act's advocacy provisions, federal

prosecutors turned to that statute's "membership" provisions. But in
Scales v. United States,42 the Court interpreted the membership provi
sions to require proof not merely of membership, but of "specific

intent" to further the organization's illegal ends.43 Driven by concerns

that guilt by association violates both the First and Fifth Amendments,
the Court ruled that individuals could not be prosecuted for mere

membership in the Communist Party, nor even for active membership
supporting its lawful ends. Instead, the Court held that the govern

ment must prove that an individual's Party activities were specifically

37. Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670.
38. See SABIN, supra note 24, at 169-70 (discussing the effect of the Yates decision).
39. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
40. See supra note 35.
41. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2003) (discussing reliance on guilt by association in pre
ventive law enforcement).
42. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
43. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 220 (1961).

2574

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:2565

intended to further criminal conduct - in effect, that he had con
spired to commit or support crime. The Court subsequently extended
that principle broadly, ruling that absent proof of specific intent, the

state could not use association to deny security clearances for work in
defense facilities, passports for travel abroad, teaching positions,

admission to the bar, or even the use of campus meeting rooms by

student groups.44 Thus, while the Court did little to block the imposi

tion of guilt by association during the early years of the Cold War, its
later decisions stemming from that period largely prohibit that tactic
today.45
The Vietnam War era also resulted in important judicial decisions

limiting or rejecting claims of national security. The Vietnam War did
not present the same sort of direct threat to national security that was
felt during the World Wars and the Cold War. But it nonetheless
prompted substantial government incursions on liberties and also pro

duced two landmark national-security cases, both of which resulted in
decisions against the government. In New York Times Co. v. United

States,46 the Court in 1971 permitted the publication of the Pentagon

Papers over the government's claim that disclosure of this secret
account of the Vietnam War would harm national security. The

44. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982) (holding
membership in NAACP insufficient basis for tort liability absent proof of specific intent);
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 1 86-87 (1972) (finding association with Students for
Democratic Socialism insufficient basis for denying use of campus meeting rooms); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967) (holding government could not deny Communist
Party members security clearances for work in defense facilities absent proof that they had
specific intent to further the Party's unlawful ends); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 606 (1967) ("[m]ere knowing membership without a specific intent to further the unlaw
ful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate basis" for barring employment
in state university system to Communist Party members); Apatheker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 5 14 (1964) (finding Communist Party membership insufficient basis for denying
passport).
45. This claim is subject to an important qualification. While the war on terrorism has
not thus far led to the direct criminalization of membership per se in political groups, the
government has resurrected the tactic of "guilt by association" in the name of cutting off ter
rorist financing. Under a 1 996 antiterrorism statute, it is a crime to provide "material sup
port" to designated "terrorist organizations," without regard to the intent, purpose, or effect
of one's support. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 303(a), 18 U.S.C.
§ 23398 (2003). Under this statute, it is no defense to show that one's support was in fact
intended to support only nonviolent humanitarian activities, nor even to show that one's
support was designed to and did in fact reduce a recipient group's reliance on violence. One
court of appeals has held that this statute does not violate the prohibition on guilt by associa
tion because it punishes not membership per se, but acts of material support. Humanitarian
Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1 130 (9th Cir. 2000). In my view, this exalts form over sub
stance. What good is the right of association if one has no right to provide any kind of sup
port to the group with which one associates? See generally David Cole, Hanging with the
Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203.
At the same time, the existence of Supreme Court precedents strongly condemning guilt by
association preclude punishing membership itself and provide strong arguments against this
new version of associational guilt.
46. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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following year, in United States v. United States District Court,47 the

Court held that the Attorney General lacked power under the
Constitution to authorize warrantless "domestic security" wiretaps.

Both cases reflected a skepticism about claims of national security and

executive prerogative, and created significant constraints on the gov
ernment's ability to enforce secrecy and to conduct searches and

wiretaps without probable cause of criminal activity.

The Court's decision in Korematsu provides the most conspicuous

counterexample to this more optimistic take on the Court's role in

reviewing national-security measures. By the time that case was
decided, according to Clinton Rossiter, "the military areas had been

disestablished and the relocation centers were being broken up. "48 Yet

the Court upheld the internment by a vote of six to three and has

never reversed the decision. Pessimists might well point to Korematsu

as an example of a j udicial decision having the opposite effect from
that which I have been emphasizing - as Justice Jackson warned at

the time, Korematsu might well have paved the way for future inroads

on civil rights and liberties in times of crisis.49 But Korematsu's legacy
suggests that Jackson's concern may have been overstated. While the

decision has not been formally overruled, eight of the Supreme

Court's sitting Justices have said that the case was wrongly decided.50

Justice Scalia, perhaps the Court's most conservative member, has

compared the decision to Dred Scott.51 In short, Korematsu has not
proved to be the "loaded weapon" that Justice Jackson feared. To the

contrary, it has served as an object lesson in what the Court and the

government ought not do in future crises.

Thus, when one takes a longer view of the role of courts in con

straining emergency powers, the picture is less bleak than the conven
tional account admits. While most of the developments discussed

above came too late to forestall civil rights and civil liberties violations

when they were initially undertaken, they have the prophylactic effect
of forestalling the same or similar measures in future emergencies.

The j udicial process is especially conducive to playing this role for
several reasons. First, since emergency powers, and the disputes to
which they give rise, tend to outlast the actual emergency, those
powers can be reviewed by courts when the worst of the crisis is over.

47. 407 U .S. 232 (1972).
48. CLINTON ROSSITER & RICHARD
COMMANDER IN CHIEF (1976).

P.

LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

49. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (ar
guing that the principle underlying the Korematsu decision "lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need").
50. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12, at 99, 261 n.42 (citing cases).
51. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the Court's liberty-protective decisions in Milligan and Kaha

namoku came when the wars were effectively over, and the Court's

protective decisions from the Cold War period began after McCarthy
had been censured and the height of anticommunist fervor had passed.
The ability (and obligation) of courts to assess the legality of measures
long after they have been adopted means that courts may bring more

perspective to the question than those acting in the midst of the emer

gency.

Second, the fact that legal decisions must offer a statement of rea

sons that then binds future cases contributes to the j udiciary's ability
to exert control over the next emergency. The obligation to create and
to follow precedent means that j udicial decisions are likely to have a
longer "shelf life" than those of other branches of government. The

lawyers' ability to distinguish the current emergency from prior ones,
and the current emergency measure from those previously invalidated,

means that the obligation to state reasons is no guarantee of future

effectiveness in protecting rights, but precedents do tend to take cer

tain options off the table. The government could not punish antiwar
speech today, for example.
Third, the common-law method facilitates a measured develop

ment of rules in the context of specific cases and permits the incorpo
ration of lessons learned from the early and often most overreactive
stages of emergencies. Once those lessons are learned and instantiated

in Supreme Court decisions, they play an important role in precluding

certain measures that were part of the government's arsenal in the

prior emergency. In this sense, just as in Marbury, the Court's emer

gency-powers decisions may not help the parties immediately before it
at the height of the controversy, but in the long run these decisions es

tablish principles that are critical to checking future government
abuse.

Fourth, the formalities of the judicial process mandate the creation

of an official record that may facilitate reaching a j ust result. The

conviction in Korematsu was ultimately overturned on a writ of coram
nobis because Korematsu was able to show, through access to gov

ernment records, that the Justice Department had misled the courts

about the strength of the evidence underlying its national-security

concerns. As the warrant requirement demonstrates, record-keeping
requirements permit evaluation of government actions after the fact.

While judicial proceedings are not necessary to impose record-keepin g

requirements, the highly formalized judicial process itself creates a
record that may make subsequent assessments, beyond the heat of the

moment, more reliable.

Fifth, and perhaps most important, federal courts are independent

of the political process, and their institutional self-definition turns in

significant part on that independence, especially when it comes to the
interpretation and enforcement of constitutional rights. As a result,
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they are better suited to entertain claims challenging executive action

than are Congress or the executive branch itself, and more likely to
take politically unpopular positions than the political branches. While,

as noted above, j udges, like other government officials, are likely to
defer to the executive branch on matters of national security, complete
deference is likely to clash with their understanding of their role as
j udges.

To be sure, j udicial decisions are not the only forces that may

constrain government actors in the next emergency. Developing

cultural norms may also play a role. As noted above, Korematsu has
never been formally overruled, but it is nonetheless highly unlikely
that anything on the scale of the Japanese internment would happen
again. The cultural condemnation of that initiative, reflected in
Congress's issuance of a formal apology and restitution,52 has been so
powerful that the option is a nonstarter even without controlling
Supreme Court law. But even here, the legislative apology followed

j udicial decisions nullifying the convictions on writs of coram nobis.53
In addition, the formal requirements that j udges give reasons that are

binding on future j udges means that j udicial decisions are likely to

play a more specific constraining function than the development of

cultural norms. Indeed, John Finn has argued that the obligation to
give reasons is constitutive of constitutionalism and underscores the

necessity of j udicial review to any meaningful system of constitutional

law.54 Cultural norms and political initiatives are rarely as clear-cut as
a legal prohibition, and their very contestability means that they are

likely to exert less restraining force than a j udicial holding. Court deci
sions are, of course, also contestable, but generally along a narrower
range of alternatives.
Thus, the conventional wisdom that courts perform poorly in crises

should be qualified by the important proviso that, when viewed over

time, j udicial decisions do exert a constraining effect on what the gov
ernment may do in the next emergency.

III. SEPTEMBER 11 TH A N D THE COURTS
How have the courts fared since September 1 1th? As Judge

Greenberg's comments at the oral argument in North Jersey Media

Group illustrate,55 the attacks of that day and the threat of future

52. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903.
53. See supra note 26.
54. JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF
33 (1991) ("Some type of constitutional review is a constitutive element of constitu
tionalism, for the activity of review, the very possibility of review, is predicated upon the ne
cessity to produce reasons in support of action taken.").
LAW

55. See Arguments Made on Deportation Hearing Regs, supra note 30.
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catastrophes place tremendous pressure on j udges. Nonetheless, a

surprising number of j udicial decisions initially upheld claims of con
stitutional rights against official antiterrorist measures. As time went
on, the picture began to look more familiar, as courts increasingly

deferred to government claims of national security. As of this writing,

the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in, and therefore all j udgments
are necessarily preliminary.

Nonetheless, given the history of j udicial deference in times of

crisis, the early decisions were quite stunning. In Center for National
Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice,56 a federal dis

trict court ruled that the Justice Department's secret arrests of hun
dreds of persons detained in a preventive detention campaign after
September 1 1th violated the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),

and ordered the government to disclose the detainees' names.
In several cases challenging the government's related practice of
closing to the public all immigration proceedings involving detainees
connected to the September 1 1th investigations, two district courts

ruled that this practice violated the First Amendment right of access of
the public,57 and one court ruled that it also violated a detainee's Fifth

Amendment due process right to a public hearing.58 The United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed one of
the First Amendment rulings, writing that "democracies die behind

closed doors. "59

A federal district j udge in New York reviewing the government's
treatment of a September 1 1th suspect, Osama Awadallah, issued a
pair of rulings lambasting the government's tactics.60 The j udge ruled

that the government had abused the "material witness" statute61 by
employing it to hold a witness for a grand jury proceeding rather than
for a criminal trial, had lied to obtain the material witness warrant,
and had physically abused Awadallah while in custody. The court
dismissed all charges against Awadallah, and ordered his release.

A district court ruled in October 2001 that a federal statute making

it a crime to provide "personnel" and "training" to designated "for

eign terrorist organizations"62 was unconstitutionally vague, reasoning

56. 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002), modified, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
57. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Mich. 2002), affd, 303 F.3d
681 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002),
rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
58. Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
59. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
60. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349
F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003).
61. 18 u.s.c. § 3144 (2000).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).
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that these terms appear to prohibit clearly protected First Amendment

activity on behalf of disfavored organizations.63 In December 2003, the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed that
decision and also ruled, by a two to one vote, that in order to satisfy
due process, a mens rea requirement must be read into the material

support statute.64 In January 2004, a district court in a related case

declared unconstitutional a USA PATRIOT Act provision criminal
izing the provision of "expert advice and assistance" to terrorist

groups.65 These provisions have proved to be the linchpin of the

government's domestic war on terrorism.66 In August 2003, another
federal j udge declared unconstitutional the ban on providing "person
nel" and "communications" to terrorist organizations, in one of the

Justice Department's most highly publicized post-September 1 1th

antiterrorist prosecutions, against the lawyer and translators for
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.67

In May 2002, the federal judges authorized to issue warrants for

searches

and

electronic wiretaps under

the

Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act ("FISA"),68 sitting as one court, ruled that the mini

mization provisions of that statute barred criminal prosecutors from
directing

foreign

intelligence

investigations

and

applications

for

warrants.69 The court cited numerous problems it had experienced

under the statute, including the fact that the government had on

seventy-five prior occasions provided the court with misleading or
inaccurate information.70
The

district

courts

hearing

challenges

to

the

detentions

of

American citizens Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, who were being held

as "enemy combatants," also rejected sweeping assertions that the de

tainees had no right to see a lawyer or to obtain j udicial review of their
detentions. In Hamdi, District Judge Robert G. Doumar rejected the

government's position that habeas corpus review was unavailable,
insisted that j udicial review was required, and sharply dismissed the

63. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, No. CV 98-1971 ABC (BQRx), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16729 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2001), modified sub norn. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003).
64. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003).
65. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV-03-6107, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 926
(U.S. Jan. 22, 2004).
66.

See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note

12, at 75-76, 256 n.11.

67. United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12531
(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003).
68. so u.s.c. §§ 1801-1863 (2000).
69. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002).
70.

Id.

at 620.
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two-page

declaration

from

a

government bureaucrat based on unidentified hearsay as insufficient

to establish the propriety of detaining Hamdi.71 In an early appeal, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the most
conservative federal appellate court in the nation, similarly rejected
the government's "sweeping contention" that the President could,

without j udicial review, designate citizens as enemy combatants and
hold them indefinitely.72

The district court hearing a habeas action on behalf of Padilla

similarly ruled that it could review the legality of the detention. And
over strong objections from the military, the court also ordered that
Padilla, who has been held incommunicado, must be granted access to
his attorney for purposes of challenging his detention.73 On appeal, the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went even further, ruling
that the President lacked any authority to hold citizens as enemy com
batants absent express authorization from Congress.74

In December 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit ruled that the foreign nationals held as enemy combat
ants in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have a right to seek habeas corpus

review

in

federal

court

of

the

legality

of

their

detentions.75

Several other lower courts had previously held to the contrary, but in

November 2003, the Supreme Court granted review of two such lower
court decisions over the opposition of the executive branch.76 In

January 2004, the Court also agreed to hear Yaser Hamdi's claims that
he was being held unlawfully as an enemy combatant, again over the

opposition of the executive branch, which had urged the Court to deny
certiorari.77 Thus, in an area where the administration initially asserted

unilateral

authority

to

detain,

unreviewable

by

the

courts,

the

Supreme Court has now agreed to exercise review. What that review

will consist of remains to be seen, of course. But the very fact that the

Court agreed to hear the cases over the executive branch's opposition

is significant.

71. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002),
Cir. 2002).

rev'd,

316 F.3d 450 (4th

72. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
73. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld,
243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reaffirming earlier decision and denying motion for re
consideration).
74. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
75. Gherebi v. Bush, No. 03-55785, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25625 (9th Cir. Dec. 18,
2003).
76. Al Odah v. United States, No. 03-343, 124 S. Ct. 534 , 2003 WL 22070725 (U.S. Nov.
1 0, 2003) (granting certiorari).
77. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696, 124 S. Ct. 981 , 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004)
(granting certiorari).

August 2003]

Judging the Next Emergency

2581

In two of the most prominent prosecutions in the war on terrorism,
those charging French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui with involvement in

the September 11th conspiracy and American citizen John Walker
Lindh with aiding Al Qaeda and conspiring to kill Americans, federal

courts ruled, again over strenuous objections from the government,
that the defendants must be granted access to enemy combatant

detainees who allegedly had exculpatory evidence about the defen

dants.7s Shortly after the district court in the Lindh case issued that
ruling, the government agreed to drop all terrorism charges in
exchange for a plea of guilty to a lesser charge.79 In the Moussaoui
case, the government has appealed the district court's ruling and has

suggested that if it does not prevail, it may remove Moussaoui's case

from the criminal process to a military tribunal.so

Four federal judges have declared unconstitutional a regulation

issued shortly after September 11th that gives immigration "prosecu
tors," or district directors, the power to keep a foreign national in
custody when the immigration judge presiding over the case has found
no basis for detention and ordered release on bond.s1 All four courts

found that the regulation violated due process by permitting preven
tive detention where no showing of flight risk or danger to the

community had been made.

These decisions suggest an increasing willingness on the part of

judges to question broad assertions of national security. At the same

time, other decisions, including subsequent decisions in several of the

same cases, fit the more traditional model of deference. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the blanket closure of immigra
tion hearings,s2 and the Supreme Court denied a petition for certio

rari.s3 A specially convened court of appeals, after entertaining a

one-sided secret appeal by the government, reversed the unanimous
decision of the PISA judges imposing limits on criminal prosecutors'

role in PISA investigations and also ruled that the USA PATRIOT

78. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003); Katherine Q. Seelye,
War on Terror Makes for Odd Twists in Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, at Al6.
79. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002); Jane Mayer, Lost in the
Jihad: Why Did the Government's Case Against John Walker Lindh Collapse?, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50.
80. Toni Locy, Moussaoui Clash Tests Future of Terror Trials, USA TODAY, July 21,
2003, at 2A; Susan Schmidt, Prosecution of Moussaoui Nears a Crossroad: Facing Demands
for Witness Testimony, Government May Turn Suspect Over to U.S. Military, WASH. POST,
Jan. 21, 2003, at A8.
81. Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D.N.J. 2003); Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d
842 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003); Almonte
Vargas v. Elwood, No. 02-CV-2666, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12387 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002).
82. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc.
123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
83. 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).

v.

Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
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Act's expansion of FISA posed no Fourth Amendment problems.84
Again, the Supreme Court denied review.85

The Fourth Circuit in a later appeal in the Hamdi case essentially

gave the government what the court earlier said it would not counte
nance - the power to detain without any meaningful judicial review.

The Fourth Circuit upheld Hamdi's detention on the basis of nothing .
more than what it characterized as the "undisputed" fact that Hamdi

had been captured on the battlefield abroad and refused to allow
Hamdi to participate in the review.86 (The court did not explain how

the circumstances of Hamdi's capture could be disputed or undisputed
when Hamdi was unable to participate in the proceeding, and the

lawyers representing his interests had no basis for knowing where he

was captured).
And with the exception of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gherebi,
federal courts have refused even to consider habeas corpus petitions
challenging the detention of foreign enemy combatants at Guan
tanamo Bay, although the Supreme Court has agreed to review the

threshold j urisdictional question on whether the courts have any

power to entertain the habeas claims.87

'

After the A wadallah decision,88 another j udge in the same federal
district ruled that the material witness statute was properly employed ·
to detain witnesses to testify in grand jury proceedings and was not

limited to criminal cases.89 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit subsequently reversed the lower court decision in A wadallah
and reinstated the perjury charges against Awadallah.90

The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the FOIA

decision requiring disclosure of the names of the September 11th
detainees, over a spirited dissent by Judge David Tatel.91 Finally, the

federal courts have uniformly dismissed constitutional concerns raised

by two Muslim charities whose assets have been frozen on vague

84. Jn re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Ct. of Review 2002).
85. ACLU v. United States, 538 U.S. 920 (2003).
86. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
87. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 534 (2003); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1 153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 .
S. Ct. 2073 (2003).
88. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd 349 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2003).
89. Jn re the Application of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
90. A wada/lah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003).
91. Ctr. for Nat'! Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004).
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charges of support for terrorism under the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act.92

It is too early to draw firm conclusions regarding the role of courts

in the war on terrorism; we are, after all, still in the initial stages of this

crisis, when courts are historically deferential, and the Supreme Court
has not yet weighed in. The lower courts' greater willingness to chal

lenge the government's national-security assertions may reflect the

fact that the buck does not stop with those courts; any ruling against
the government in this area is likely to be but one stop along the road
to appeal. The Supreme Court was able to reach the result it did
in Marbury in part because it left the President with nothing to defy,
and thereby created the space to · announce its doctrine of j udicial
supremacy. So, too, a district court decision on a matter of national se
curity is unlikely to be the j udiciary's last word, and therefore it may

be easier for a district court to rule against the government's national

security assertions. The further up the appellate chain, the more likely

a judicial decision will be determinative, and consequently, the more
pressure judges may feel to uphold the government's actions.
Cultural factors may also play a role in the marginally increased

willingness of courts to question the government's national-security

initiatives.

As Jack Goldsmith

and

Cass

Sunstein have

argued,

President Bush's order authorizing military tribunals sparked a much

more critical public reaction than did President Franklin Delano

Roosevelt's use of military tribunals during World War 11.93 They

attribute the change to an increasing distrust of government in the

wake of Vietnam and Watergate, and to a "massively strengthened
commitment to individual rights" in our constitutional law.94

Without a doubt, the Vietnam era, and especially the revelations of

FBI abuses targeted at antiwar and civil rights protesters during that
period, effected a seismic shift in public and judicial attitudes toward
executive power and national-security claims.95 Before Vietnam, J.

Edgar Hoover was a national hero; today his name is shorthand for
politically

motivated

government

repression.

The

abuses

of

COINTELPRO, including extensive wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther

92. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C.
2002), affd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp.
2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002), affd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Global
Relief Found., Inc. v. Snow, 124 S. Ct. 531 (2003).
93. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R . Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMM. 261 (2003).
94. Id. at 282.
95. See generally SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976); FRANK DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE:
THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM (1980).
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King, Jr., infiltration and disruption of lawful political organizations

through "dirty tricks," secret warrantless searches, and the compiling
of extensive records on the Bureau's critics, all undertaken under the

rubric of "national security," have given the public and the media

good reason to be skeptical about assertions of unchecked executive
power.

Significantly, the Supreme Court itself took part in that transfor

mation, as it permitted the publication of the Pentagon Papers,96 held

unconstitutional

warrantless

"domestic

security"

wiretaps,97

and

rejected President Nixon's broad assertions of executive privilege in

connection with the Watergate prosecutions.98 In each of these cases,

the Court stood up to the government, and its public reputation was
enhanced as a result. That experience may well play a role in the

courts' apparently greater willingness to challenge the government in
the current era.99

A third factor may be the dramatically increased presence of

human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and immigrants' rights groups. ·
During the Cold War, for example, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the organization one might expect to be defending the
Communists, was busy purging itself of Communists. HJO The National

Lawyers Guild was one of the few legal organizations to defend
Communists' rights, and the Attorney General and the Director of the
FBI targeted it as a Communist front organization for its efforts.101

Today, by contrast, the ACLU has been a vigorous defender of

civil liberties, and it stands among a broad spectrum of organizations

and institutions that have spoken out for the need to respect civil

liberties in the war on terrorism. These include human rights organiza
tions such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights; civil liberties and civil

rights groups such as the Center for Constitutional Rights, the

National Lawyers Guild, the National Committee to Protect Political
Freedom, and the Center for National Security Studies; immigrants'
rights

and

ethnicity-based

groups

such

as

the

American-Arab

96. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
97. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 232 (1972).
98. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
99. Coincidentally, the district court judge who initially barred the use of "domestic se
curity" wiretaps, Judge Damon Keith, also wrote the decision for the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit declaring unconstitutional John Ashcroft's blanket closure of immigration
hearings.
100. See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A
ACLU 173-216 (1990).

H ISTORY OF THE

101. Id. at 177, 264-65; see also ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN
MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT 364 (1978); ATHAN G. THEOHARIS &
JOHN STUART Cox, THE BULL: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND THE GREAT AMERICAN
INQUISITION 21 8-19 (1 988).
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Anti-Discrimination Committee, the American Immigration Lawyers'
Association, the Asian American Legal Defense Fund, the National

Immigration Forum, and the Japanese American Citizens League;
grassroots organizing groups such as the Bill of Rights Defense

Committees; religious groups such as the Muslim Public Affairs

Council and the Council on American Islamic Relations; electronic

privacy-focused groups such as the

Center for Democracy

and

Technology and the Electronic Privacy Information Center; and liber
tarian organizations such as the Cato Institute. Most of these groups

did not even exist during the Cold War. Their active and vocal pres

ence today creates opportunities for grassroots involvement and

education; generates reports and press releases on civil liberties
abuses; gives voice to those who would otherwise be voiceless; and

brings both

domestic

and

international

media

attention

to

the

government's excesses.102 That in turn affects the broader culture of
concern about rights, which may lead courts to be more attentive than
they might otherwise be to concerns on the liberty side of the security

liberty balance.

In short, while courts remain no panacea, we ought not dismiss

them too quickly, as they have the potential to play a critical role in

checking emergency powers.

IV. AN UNTIMELY PROPOSAL
Despite these developments, some commentators have recently

argued that the Constitution and, by extension, the courts ought not

play much of a role at all in restricting the government's emergency
powers. Professors Oren Gross and Mark Tushnet have each proposed
that in light of the failure of constitutional constraints to limit execu

tive action during emergencies, it might be better to recognize explic

itly the validity of extraconstitutional measures during emergencies, or
put differently, to acknowledge that emergency powers are not gov
erned by the Constitution. 103 Both do so in large part to avoid tainting

102. One initiative in particular has appeared to be especially influential. Soon after the
USA PATRIOT Act was enacted, the Bill of Rights Defense Committee formed to pursue a
grassroots strategy of getting local towns and counties to adopt resolutions condemning the
civil liberties abuses of the Patriot Act. As of February 2004, 242 jurisdictions had adopted
such resolutions, including three states - Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont - and several
major cities, including Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, San Francisco, and
Albuquerque. See Bill of Rights Def. Comm., http:l/www.bordc.org (last updated Feb. 6,
2004). The initiative appears to have shifted public views toward the Patriot Act, prompting
the Attorney General to launch an unprecedented speaking tour to seek to defend the Act.
See David Cole, On the Road with Ashcroft, NATION, Sept. 22, 2003, at 22.
103. Gross, supra note 14; Tushnet, supra note 14. Professor George Alexander before
them made a similar argument, contending that because courts perform poorly in emergen
cies, they should not get involved at all, and "redress must be achieved politically if it is to be
effective." George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National
Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 27, 65 (1984).
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constitutional law for ordinary times with decisions rendered on the
exercise of emergency authorities. Justice Jackson warned of precisely
such danger in his dissent in Korematsu. He maintained that as
threatening to liberty as the military order establishing Japanese

internment was, "a j udicial construction of the due process clause that

will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the

promulgation of the order itself." 104 He reasoned that the military

order would last only so long as the emergency and could be lifted by
a subsequent commander, but that

once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it con

forms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show

that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and
of transplanting American citizens.105

Justice Jackson's proposal was in fact far more modest than his

critique. He argued that the civil courts ought not play a role in

enforcing military orders.106 Korematsu's case arose from a criminal
prosecution in civil court for violating the military's exclusion order,
and Justice Jackson would have reversed the conviction on the ground
that civilian courts ought not dirty their hands with the military's busi

ness. But Jackson's proposal is as ineffectual as it is modest. It would

have resolved Korematsu's case, but it would not have removed civil

ian courts from the business of reviewing the legality of military deten

tion. Other detainees might well have filed habeas corpus actions

challenging the validity of their detention. Unless Justice Jackson was

prepared to say that the courts could unilaterally suspend the writ of

habeas corpus for any military detention, he could not have avoided
the necessity of passing j udgment on the military's actions.
Mark

Tushnet,

in

a

thoughtful

article

provocatively

titled

Defending Korematsu?,107 cites Jackson's observations but takes them

one step further. Not content with Jackson's prescription, Tushnet
argues much more broadly for affirmative recognition of extraconsti
tutional emergency powers: "it is better to have emergency powers

exercised in an extraconstitutional way, so that everyone understands
that the actions are extraordinary, than to have the actions rational
ized away as consistent with the Constitution and thereby normal
ized. "108 In his view, this is justified in order "to avoid normalizing the

exception. "109

104. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 247 (Jackson, J ., dissenting).
107. Tushnet, supra note 14.
108. Id. at 306.
109. Id. at 307.
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Oren Gross advocates a similar approach in much more detail in
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises A lways Be
Constitutional?110 Gross contends, like Tushnet, that as a matter of

reality we should candidly acknowledge that executive officials in

times of crisis will act extraconstitutionally, and that we should do so
in order to avoid "contaminat[ing]" the ordinary legal system with

emergency powers.1 1 1 Gross would "inform public officials that they
may act extralegally when they believe that such action is necessary

for protecting the nation and the public in the face of calamity pro

vided that they openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of their

actions. " 1 1 2 Because on this view extralegal authority is expressly per
mitted, the courts would not play a role in restraining such authority.

Instead, it would "be up to the people to decide, either directly or

indirectly (e.g., through their elected representatives in the legisla
ture), how to respond to such actions.'' 1 13 Like Tushnet, Gross insists
that his approach is aimed at "the preservation of the constitutional

order and of its most fundamental principles and tenets."114 He argues
that the requirement that officials seeking to exercise such powers
must act openly in defiance of the law and throw themselves on the

j udgment of the people would serve as an important deterrent to
executive abuse of emergency powers.

These proposals are misguided. While I share to some extent the

authors' skepticism about the ability of courts to protect the individual

rights of those before them in national-security emergencies, both

authors ignore the long-term benefits that j udicial decisions in the

national-security area have had in narrowing the range of rights
violative options available to the government in the next emergency.

Were courts to adopt the Gross-Tushnet notion that extraconstitu

tional measures are appropriate during emergencies, and that the only

real check is political, much would be lost and little gained in the pro
tection of civil liberties.

I would hesitate to adopt the Gross-Tushnet position for several

reasons. First, it is predicated on a distinction between "emergency"

p�riods and "normal" periods that, as Gross himself has convincingly
shown, simply cannot be maintained. As Gross argues, "the belief in

our ability to separate emergency from normalcy, counter-terrorism
measures from the ordinary set of legal rules and norms," is a danger
ous illusion.115 The United States has been under one state of emer-

1 10. Gross, supra note 14.
1 1 1 . Id. at 1133.
1 12. Id. at 1023.
1 13. Id.
1 14. Id. at 1024.
115. Gross, supra note 14, at 1022, 1069-96.
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gency or another since 1 933; by the mid-1970s, there were more than
470 "emergency" laws on the books.116 Israel has been under an emer
gency regime since it was established as a state more than fifty years
ago. 1 17 And Great Britain has been under a state of emergency for
most of the last thirty years, occasioned first by the IRA and later by
the attacks of September l lth. 1 18 Thus, emergency powers have a way

of surviving long after the emergency has passed, and emergencies
themselves may last decades. Emergency measures adopted in the

United States today are especially likely to be long-lasting, given the

nature of the war on terrorism, which is more like the war on drugs
than a traditional war between nations. 1 19 When Donald Rumsfeld was

asked when the war on terrorism would be over (and therefore when
the Guantanamo enemy combatant detainees would be freed), he

answered that the war would not be over until there were no longer

any "effective global terrorist networks functioning in the world."120

Vice President Richard Cheney has been even more candid, arguing
that we should consider the current period not an emergency at all,

but "the new normalcy. "121

If the line between emergency and normal is evanescent, a doctrine

of extraconstitutional authority cannot be safely cabined to emergency
times. Far from protecting the Constitution in normal times, then, a

doctrine expressly authorizing extralegal actions during emergencies

would be at least as likely to contaminate the norm by expanding the

realm of available government measures across the board as would

insistence on a continuing role for courts and the Constitution in.
checking emergency and nonemergency government action.

Second, the Gross-Tushnet proposal to acknowledge extraconstitu

tional power would be likely to undermine the protection of rights

1 16. Glenn E. Fuller, Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the
Executive's Crisis Powers with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1453
( 1 979). When the Senate considered a balanced budget amendment in 1995, Senator Howell
Heflin proposed a "national security" exception and implied that it would have been appro
priately invoked some 200 times in the 220 years of the republic. See Theodore P. Seto,
Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What It ls Supposed to Do (and
No More), 1 06 YALE L.J. 1449, 1533 (1 997).
1 17. Gross, supra note 14, at 1073.
1 18. Id. at 1074.
1 19. Tushnet concedes that the war on terrorism is more like a "condition" than an
"emergency," but he does not explain how or even whether judges in his model would dis
tinguish between the two. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 297.
120. News Transcript, Dep 't of Defense News Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and General
Myers (Mar. 28, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ transcripts/2002/ !03282002
_t0328sd.html.
1 2 1 . Lynn Ludlow, Paper Tigers, S.F. CHRONICLE, Nov. 4, 2001, at C2; Bob Woodward,
CIA Told To Do " Whatever Necessary " to Kill Bin Laden; Agency and Military Collobarat
ing at " Unprecedented" Level; Cheney Says War Against Terror "May Never End, " WASH.
POST, Oct. 21 , 2001 , at A l .
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during emergencies (and by extension, during normal times that offi
cials call emergencies). Gross claims that his proposal would have a
salutary deterrent effect on official abuse of emergency powers,
because officials could never be certain that their actions would in fact
be ratified after the fact. And he argues that shifting the locus of j usti

fication and j udgment from the j udiciary to a political forum - the

people or their elected representatives - would avoid the problem

identified by Justice Jackson of formally authorizing emergency meas
ures through judicial approval.

There are substantial reasons, however, to doubt both of Gross's

claims. Even if acknowledging the legitimacy of extralegal measures
would avoid formal j udicial approval, it would not avoid the creation

of less formal precedents that could be pointed to later to j ustify fur
ther incursions on liberties. The post hoc political rationalization pro

cess that Gross envisions, while lacking the attributes of the formal le

gal process, would nonetheless generate a more informal common law
of extralegal emergency authorities. Once the political process has
ratified a particular extralegal emergency action, officials will be able

to point to that precedent as j ustification for their own subsequent
actions. "Illegal" measures deemed permissible after the fact will no
longer be clearly illegal, so long as a subsequent emergency can be

analogized to the emergency found to warrant the illegal action previ
ously.122

Nor is it clear that the Gross-Tushnet proposal would have the

effect of avoiding formal j udicial approval of emergency measures.
Even if we were to adopt such a scheme, public officials would be
exceedingly unlikely to admit that their actions were extralegal.

Rather, they would almost invariably argue first that their measures

were constitutional and argue only in the alternative that their actions
were j ustified even if illegal.123 As a result, courts would continue to

have to address the legality of emergency measures, and the drive to

accommodate the Constitution to emergency conditions would con
tinue to exert pressure on constitutional j urisprudence. Given the
open-ended character of the Constitution and the fact that few of the
liberties it protects are absolute, there will rarely be an emergency
measure that government lawyers cannot defend with some constitu-

122. The 1988 statute offering restitution and an apology to the victims of the Japanese
internment program suggests that at some point the political process may repudiate prior
emergency measures. But that is almost certainly the exception that proves the rule. It took
forty years to achieve and came only after the federal courts had themselves repudiated the
convictions arising from the exclusion and internment programs. See supra note 26. Had the
political process been asked to ratify the internment at the time, or in the decade or so that
followed it, there is no evidence to suggest the result would have been repudiation rather
than ratification.
123. See FINN, supra note 54, at 9 (1991) ("Even public officials who propose action that
is arguably extraconstitutional typically seek to justify their actions on constitutional
grounds.").
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tional argument. And while an open acknowledgment of the propriety

of extralegal measures might reduce the hydraulic forces inducing

courts to uphold emergency actions, the extent to which this would
"save" normal constitutional law or deter abuse of emergency powers
seems likely to be minimal. For the reasons stated above, courts would
presumably still be reticent to rule against the government in emer

gency periods. And the open acknowledgment of the validity of extra

constitutional authority would seriously undercut the force of j udicial

decisions that now constrain emergency measures.

From the standpoint of deterring the abuse of emergency author- ,
ity, the Gross-Tushnet proposal is not very different from what

already exists. If a government official today adopts an extraconstitu- ,
tional response to an emergency and his actions are later declared
unconstitutional, he may in theory be subject to civil or criminal sanc

tions. But the likelihood that criminal or civil sanctions will be

imposed is, in fact, virtually nil, and in any event the state nearly
always indemnifies its officials from such liability.124 Moreover, such an

official could always seek political post hoc ratification, in the form of

immunity or indemnity from Congress or a pardon from the President.

Thus, under the status quo, elected officials who act extraconstitution
ally already face some, albeit limited, risk of liability, and have some
political recourse to avoid liability.

Third, there is little reason to trust the political process to do the

job of judging that Gross and Tushnet would assign to it. The real dif
ference under a Gross-Tushnet approach would be that the principal

job of j udging emergency measures would presumptively fall not on

the courts but on the political process. But this seems the most dubi

ous aspect of the proposal. If courts are not particularly reliable in ·
imposing limits on executive action during emergencies, the political

process would almost certainly be worse. As Gross himself argues, the

public and their elected representatives are especially prone to over

reaction during times of crisis.125 The public is easily scared, and quick
to approve of security measures launched in its name, especially if the

measures do not directly affect the rights of the majority. Their elected

representatives know that, and vote accordingly. Indeed, the very rea

son that we adopted a Constitution was that we understood that the

people and their representatives would be tempted to violate basic
principles in times of stress. In the words of Senator John Stockton in

1871: "Constitutions are chains with which men bind themselves in

124. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public,
Officials' Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65 (1999) (critiquing the breadth of
immunity doctrines and noting that indemnification of government officials is nearly univer
sal).
125. Gross, supra note 14, at 1035-42.
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their sane moments that they may not die by a suicidal hand in the day
of their frenzy."126

Moreover, emergency measures almost always selectively target
vulnerable groups and individuals, and foreign nationals in particular,

making the political process an especially unreliable check on emer
gency powers.127 This fact apparently does not concern Tushnet;128 but
for those concerned with the human rights of the most vulnerable,

proposals that point to political rather than judicial processes for
assessing the validity of emergency measures are fatally flawed.

Finally, Gross and Tushnet's proposal rests on the conventional

wisdom that courts cannot be trusted to perform well in times of crisis.
But

the

real

question

to be

asked

when assessing the

courts'

performance is: Compared to what? The courts are undoubtedly

highly imperfect; but the alternatives are worse. One cannot rely on
the executive branch to police itself in times of crisis. As Francis

Biddle, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Attorney General, candidly
acknowledged, "The Constitution has not bothered any wartime

President."129 Executive officials after September 1 1th knew that they

would take a much bigger "hit" politically if there were another
terrorist act than if they locked up thousands of foreign nationals

unconnected to terrorism. In such periods, executive officials ask for
untrammeled authority, and assure the public that they will not abuse
it. History shows that such trust is not warranted.

Congress is also unlikely to be a guardian of civil liberties. Its

overwhelming approval of the Smith Act130 and the Internal Security

Act131 during the McCarthy era and of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act132 and the Patriot Act133 in the current era, coupled
with its appropriation of funds for the Japanese internment in World

126.

CONG. GLOBE, 42d

Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (1871).

127. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12; David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN . L.
REV. 953 (2002); Gross, supra note 14, at 1037, 1082-85.
128. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 296-97 (arguing that the Justice Department's selective
targeting of Arab and Muslim foreign nationals for questioning, secret detentions and trials,
and selective deportation "does not seem to be a violation of civil liberties," and if so, are
only "violations of the rights of residents who are not U.S. citizens"). In my view, these ac
tions violated a wide range of constitutional rights, and the fact that they specifically affected
foreign nationals, the most vulnerable and voiceless among us, only exacerbates the wrongs.
See generally COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12.
129.

FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY

219 (1962).

130. Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
131. Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81 -831, 64 Stat. 987.
132. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214.
133. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 1 15
Stat. 272.
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War II, illustrate that legislators are exceedingly unlikely to stand up

against executive power in the name of civil liberties during emergen
cies. The need to be seen as "doing something" about the threat often
translates into legislation that delegates sweeping powers to the execu
tive branch.

Only the courts have an obligation to entertain claims of rights

violations. The executive and legislative branches can simply choose to
ignore such claims, and are likely to do so when those claims are not
backed by substantial political power or influence. By contrast,

assuming standing and j usticiability, courts must adjudicate any claim
that a government initiative violates constitutional rights. As a result,

courts are often the only forum realistically available. For more than

two years, the President has asserted the unilateral power to detain

anyone he labels as an enemy combatant. Congress has done nothing
to check or limit or even seriously address this assertion of power. The

courts, by contrast, have addressed the question and issued multiple

opinions, all of which are as of this writing headed for Supreme Court
review.

To cite another example, over the past decade and a half, I have

represented thirteen foreign nationals whom the government accused

of having ties to terrorist organizations and sought to detain or deport
using classified evidence that the foreign nationals had no opportunity

to confront or rebut.134 The government maintained that the individu

als' presence in the United States threatened national security, and

that revealing the evidence that proved that contention would itself
endanger national security. All thirteen were eventually released

without undermining national security, but only when we challenged
the government's actions in court as a violation of due process. Of the
thirteen, twelve were Arab and/or Muslim. The thirteenth was a

Kenyan woman married to a Palestinian and accused of being associ

ated with a Palestinian organization.

What were our options in seeking to protect these individuals' con

stitutional rights? Congress would not help them. The issue of secret

evidence in immigration proceedings had been raised in Congress, but

far from providing a remedy, in 1996 Congress expressly expanded

and authorized its use in a number of immigration settings.135 The ex

ecutive branch was equally unresponsive. It was the executive branch,
after all, that invoked the tactic in the first place. Even under the ad
ministration of President Bill Clinton, the executive branch was not a
source of relief. And the public and the press, with a few exceptions,

by and large paid little attention. When a court ordered an individual

1 34. See generally David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15
(2000-2001).

J . L. & RELIGION 267

135. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 401 (codified at 8 U .S.C. § 1531
(2000)).
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released, its decision would often receive coverage in the print media.

But I received countless phone calls from television news producers
over the years looking for legal stories, all of whom ultimately deter

mined that the secret evidence story would not sell because it involved

foreign nationals rather than citizens. 136 For my clients, it was court or
nothing, court or more years of detention based on evidence they

could not see. And to their credit, the courts were uniformly skeptical
of the government's claims, and protective of the foreign nationals'
right to see the evidence being used to deprive them of their liberty.137
Even immigration j udges, who as administrative j udges ultimately re
viewable by the Attorney General lack the independence of the fed
eral courts, were highly skeptical of the government's claims.138

Because courts are the only realistic option available to those

targeted by emergency measures, and precisely because judges are all
too human and already face substantial pressure to avoid fulfilling
their responsibility, it seems especially misguided to advocate that they
do so. The formal guarantees and ethical obligation of independence
do not mean that j udges are in fact always impartial and courageous,

but the insistence that it is their obligation to be independent is critical
to the enterprise of j udging. We should not let j udges off the hook

when it comes to emergency matters, because they are the only real

option for most persons targeted by emergency measures. As Fred
Schauer has eloquently argued in a different setting, "The mere fact

that courts will fold under pressure, however, does not dictate that
they should be told that they may fold under pressure, because the

effect of the message may be to increase the likelihood of folding even
when the pressure is less."139 Schauer continued, "Resisting the inevi
table is not to be desired because it will prevent the inevitable, but

136. I am aware of only one exception. CBS's 60 Minutes covered the story of the gov
ernment's use of secret evidence to deny entry to a group of Iraqis who had been involved in
a failed CIA-backed coup attempt against Saddam Hussein, had been airlifted out of Iraq by
the United States, but had then been determined at the border to have been double agents
based on classified evidence. 60 Minutes: Unfinished Business: Six Iraqis Brought to the
United States by the US Government for Help Against Saddam Hussein Are Imprisoned on
Undisclosed Charges by the INS (CBS television broadcast, July 25, 1999). But it is likely that
60 Minutes' interest in the story stemmed as much from the identity of the Iraqis' pro bono
lawyer - former CIA Director James Woolsey - as from their predicament.
137. See, e.g. , American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070
(9th Cir. 1995); Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 512-13, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1 989); Al Najjar v.
Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 273 F.3d 1330
(11th Cir. 2001); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1 999).
138. See Cole, supra note 134, at 272-75. The immigration j udges' skepticism suggests
that relief was sometimes available within the executive branch. But it is significant that the
relief came only from judges within the executive branch.
139. Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1075, 1084 n.11 (1986).
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because it may be the best strategy for preventing what is less inevita
ble but more dangerous.

"140

In my view, the historical record does not demonstrate that courts

will inevitably fold under the pressure of emergencies, but only that
they will often do so. The historical developments reviewed above

suggest that at least some j udges may have learned from history to
demand more narrowly tailored responses to emergencies. But more

important, the record also shows that by exercising their responsibility
to decide cases pitting individual rights against emergency executive

power, the courts have over time developed rules that do constrain the

executive in the next emergency. The danger of Gross and Tushnet's
proposal is that we would be sacrificing even that for benefits that
seem evanescent at best.

CONCLUSION
Courts, like every other institution of human governance, are
imperfect. Tasked with the job of enforcing individual constitutional
rights against the majority's will, judges remain prone to the same

fears and anxieties that afflict us all during times of crisis. Thus, it

should not be a surprise that courts have all too often deferred to
unfounded assertions of government power on issues of national secu

rity; when the executive claims that the fate of the nation is at stake, it

takes real courage to stand up to that assertion and subject it to careful
scrutiny.

At the same time, the conventional wisdom that courts have failed

during times of crisis is itself overstated. It is based both on a snapshot

view of the courts' decisions, and on an overly idealized vision of what

is in fact possible. When considered over time, courts have played a

valuable role in reviewing and ultimately restraining some of the more

egregious rights violations undertaken in the name of saving the coun
try. Judicial decisions, while rarely providing relief to the initial vic
tims of a crisis mentality, have played a role in restricting the options
available to the government in the next emergency. Like Marbury v.

Madison itself, these decisions may well be more important over the

long run than their bottom lines would make them appear in the short

run.

Given the salutary role that courts have played in enforcing consti

tutional limits on emergency responses, and given the paucity of

credible alternatives, we should be reluctant to let j udges off the hook.

There seems to be little reason to trust the political branches to be
more attentive to constitutional rights concerns than courts, even if
courts themselves do not always perform as we might hope they

140. Id. at 1085.

would.

As
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Eugene

Rostow

argued

in

assessing

the

Japanese

internment cases shortly after they were decided, "It is hard to imag

ine what courts are for if not to protect people against unconstitutional

arrest. . . . It is essential to every democratic value in society that offi

cial action taken in the name of the war power be held to standards of

responsibility. "141

141. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases - A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489,
5 1 1 , 514 (1945).

